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Abstract 
In his essay “The Revolution that didn’t happen”
1
 Steven Weinberg argues that Kuhn’s 
scheme cannot properly describe modern developments in physics and that there has not 
been a scientific revolution in this field in the 20
th
 or 21
st 
century. I agree with both of 
Weinberg’s claims, but I disagree with his premise in both cases. I propose an account of 
Relativity Theory and Quantum Physics indicating a coexistence of two paradigms. I 
suggest that modern developments in physics underline the necessity of a wide approach 
to the concept of paradigm, but a proper model of their philosophical implications is 
lacking. It is concluded that modern physics can not be adequately explained applying a 
cumulative description. 
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1. A brief history of modern physics 
 
Towards the end of the 19
th
 century Newtonian mechanics and classical physics displayed all 
the characteristics of a unified paradigm. Precise predictions and a comprehensive 
mathematics at the core seemed convincing. Uncovered territory remained, in physics and 
certainly in biology, but the fundamental theory provided the direction for future scientific 
explorations. The confidence in the accomplishments of the field was unequivocally 
demonstrated by a famous end-of-science statement made in 1894 by the Nobel laureate 
Albert A. Michelson:  
“The more important fundamental laws and facts of physical science have all been 
discovered, and these are now so firmly established that the possibility of their ever being 
supplanted in consequence of new discoveries is exceedingly remote. Future discoveries 
must be looked for in the sixth place of decimals”.
2
 
Supported by this reliance on scientific advance, a positivist perspective of the role of science 
was maintained. Progress along the established lines was seen as the route to the reality of the 
physical universe, and an increasing recognition of the deterministic natural laws of cause and 
effect would be achieved along with our ability to predict and control our surroundings. 
At the very outset of the 20
th
 century this outlook changed radically. In 1900, Planck, 
proposed a theory that light was emitted discontinuously in certain quantities (quanta), 
entirely disproving the notion of the distribution of light as a continuous wave
3
. Bohr 
accounted for quantum levels in atomic spectra in 1913
4
, and in 1926
5
, through further 
developments by Heisenberg and Schrödinger, the correspondence between waves and the 
                                                 
2
 Speech delivered at the dedication of the University of Chicago’s Ryerson Physical Laboratory 
 
3
 Planck demonstrated that in electromagnetic waves there is no restriction on the wavelength or frequencies, but 
the energy levels are restricted to values that correlate to a certain fixed unit (Planck’s constant). This designated 
a representation of energy as particles. Planck, (1900).  
 
4
 Bohr described the discontinuous motion of electrons in the Hydrogen atom from their ground state to higher 
energy levels in such a way that electrons move in precisely defined steps in relation to the nucleus it orbits. The 
energy levels correlate to the number of electrons it is composed of (not a one-to-one correlation). Bohr, (1913). 
 
5
 Heisenberg accounted for the transition between energy levels by employing matrix mechanics, and described 
the electron on grounds of the “particle-like” properties of position and momentum. Heisenberg, (1925). 
Schrödinger reconciled matrix and wave mechanics by demonstrating how they can be reduced to each other 
mathematically. Schrödinger, (1926). 
 
 5 
quanta was formulated. This suggested that, at the atomic level, causal connections - the basic 
premise of classical physics - had to be revised altogether. 
In 1905
6
 Einstein published his paper on Special Relativity proposing that qualities like 
distance and mass could not be completely described without considering their relationship to 
the observer or the act of measuring the properties. In 1915
7
, in his paper “General theory of 
Relativity”, Einstein expanded his theory to account for gravitation. In contrast to Newton’s 
flat space and time, gravitation could be reduced to the curvature in the very structure of 
space-time, directly challenging the core of Newtonian mechanics. 
 
2. Kuhn’s morphology 
 
In Structure of a Scientific Revolution
8
 Kuhn depicts a development of scientific communities, 
catalyst by non-conforming breakthroughs, as questioning their central theories and 
assumptions. Up to this point, the general consensus in philosophy of science was that of the 
positivist cumulative description connected with the Newtonian scheme. Scientific 
development amounts to adding to new truths to the established, by simply extending the 
theory to which it has been added. Of course, revision and inaccuracies appeared, but the 
scientific method assured improvement. 
 
Contrastingly, on Kuhn’s view, scientific development occurs through recurring states of 
“normal” and “revolutionary” stages. Normal stages correspond in many ways to the 
positivist cumulative view, during which the theory is used and applied while the fundamental 
assumptions are not questioned.  During revolutionary stages, on the other hand, the basic 
                                                 
6
 Prior to this, the notion of “ether” as a fixed coordinate system was widely held. Einstein “democratized” this 
perspective by maintaining the speed of light to be constant, but eliminating a selected frame of reference, 
subjecting all systems to the same physical laws.  
 
7
 In Newton’s scheme gravity was seen as an interactive power between physical objects, but Einstein proposed 
that the perceived interaction could be reduced to the objects “warping” effect on space and time. 
 
8
 Kuhn (1996). Referred to as Structure
 6 
elements of the field are examined, and to the extent that these stages amount to more than 
shifts of mode or special cases of normal science
9
.  
 
Central to the notion of revolutionary development is the recognition that underlying any 
specific scientific field is a set of assumptions and a commitment to some particular 
knowledge content. This is what Kuhn refers to in Structure as a “paradigm” or, 
alternatively, a “disciplinary matrix”. The fact that scientific activity relies on such a 
disciplinary matrix is, in itself, not a radical position, and can be reconciled with the positivist 
view. The notion that in scientific communities these frameworks are substituted with new 
ones is, however, in direct opposition to positivist view. Kuhn suggests that each individual 
scientific field is subject to a development in which the body of non-conforming experimental 
results (anomalies)
10
 will at some point become so massive that the underlying assumptions 
are once again examined. Ultimately, if the anomalies cannot be reconciled with the 
underlying assumptions, they will be abandoned and a new paradigm will be established.  
 
The shift from Aristotelian to Newtonian physics is considered the exemplary case of a 
paradigm shift. Weinberg recognizes this;  
 
"[the] shift from Aristotelian to Newtonian physics—the shift (which actually took many 
centuries) from Aristotle's attempt to give systematic qualitative descriptions of 
everything in nature to Newton's quantitative explanations of carefully selected 
phenomena, such as the motion of the planets around the sun. (…) Now, that really was a 
paradigm shift.”
11
  
 
Newton explicated motion deterministically, depicting how physical bodies moved in 
accordance with predictable external properties like gravity and friction, in direct contrast to 
Aristotle’s notion of motion as a quality of the moving object itself. It is evident that 
                                                 
9
 Kuhn’s notion of incommensurability is not addressed in the following, even though this is part of Weinberg’s 
objection to Kuhn’s scheme. In my view, the debate on the teleology of science can be kept separate from the 
assessment of contemporary physics and its morphology.  
10
 Kuhn defines anomalies as challenging the “paradigm-induced expectations that govern normal science”. 
Kuhn (1996), pp. 33. 
 
11
 Weinberg, pp. 52 
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Aristotle’s scheme can in no way be considered a special case of Newton’s. And further, that 
this shift disputes the notion that general physical theories are exclusively established on 
“pure observation” or that science progresses orderly and inductively.   
 
 
3. Mature science 
 
Being a trained physicist Weinberg is intimately familiar with the situation in physics today. 
In his opinion Kuhn’s scheme of revolutionary changes does not apply to the situation in 
physics today. His specific assessment on modern physics is part of a general notion that; 
once a science becomes a mature field, it is no longer subject to revolutionary change.  
 
"In judging the nature of scientific progress, we have to look at mature scientific theories, 
not theories at the moments when they are coming into being."
12
  
 
It is argued, that scientific practices are established as fully developed and mature when a 
scientific field achieves a well-tested theory
13
. Individually, this is not a controversial notion 
for Kuhn’s scheme, but certainly the position that when a theory achieves this status it is no 
longer subject to revolutionary change is. On this view, a mature theory is integrated rather 
than rejected by the subsequent theory and, hence, does not run the risk of being invalidated 
by new innovations. 
There are good arguments for making a case for a strict division between pre-mature and 
mature science in this regard. Kuhn’s scheme is an historical case study, and thus, a 
retrospective approach. On Weinberg’s view all case studies in Structure are of sciences that 
are not mature. From the moment of maturity, the scientific progress of that field will be of a 
cumulative nature. Specifically, it is advocated, physics became a mature theory with 
Newtonian mechanics. Accordingly, the developments of Relativity and Quantum physics 
apply to a cumulative model and can be integrated with the Newtonian scheme. Newtonian 
mechanics and classical physics can be considered special cases of Relativity and Quantum 
physics. Consequently, when a theory has been sufficiently established its further 
development does not comply with Kuhn’s scheme.  
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 Weinberg, pp. 50 
 
13
 The concept of mature science remains underdeveloped throghout the essay.  
 8 
“Revolutions in science seem to fit Kuhn's description only to the extent that they mark a 
shift in understanding some aspect of nature from pre-science to modern science. The 
birth of Newtonian physics was a mega-paradigm shift, but nothing that has happened in 
our understanding of motion since then—not the transition from Newtonian to Einsteinian 
mechanics, or from classical to quantum physics—fits Kuhn's description of a paradigm 
shift."
14
 
There are further reasons to maintain this position. On Kuhn’s scheme, when facing 
anomalies, scientific theories resort to one of two strategies; (1) the scientific community 
becomes fractioned and strives to provide ad-hoc solutions to retain the fundamental theory, 
or (2) attempts to reconcile the anomalies with the fundamental theory fail and is ultimately 
overthrown. The activity of both (1) and (2) constitute revolutionary changes and disrupts the 
productivity of the normal science periods. But neither (1) or (2) provide a good description 
of modern physics. Although numerous revolutionary achievements have been made in 
physics in the 20
th
 century, the totality of these successes has not resulted in the rejection of 
classical physics. 
Finally, considering the scientific community, Newtonian mechanics and classical physics 
remain normal practice and is part of the curriculum of every physics student. Hence, the 
cognitive habits of classical physics co-exist with scientific work in Relativity and Quantum 
physics.  
"The greater revolutions of this century, quantum mechanics and relativity (…) are the 
basis of the physics research of my generation. (…) Our ideas have changed, but we have 
continued to assess our theories in pretty much the same way: a theory is taken as a 
success if it is based on simple general principles and does a good job of accounting for 
experimental data in a natural way. I am not saying that we have a book of rules that tells 
us how to assess theories, or that we have a clear idea what is meant by "simple general 
principles" or "natural." I am only saying that whatever we mean, there have been no 
sudden changes in the way we assess theories."
15
 
It seems reasonable to agree that even if theories cannot be ultimately established, it is 
counter-intuitive to assume that a fundamental physical theory, that has proven efficacious in 
accounting for a vast range of phenomena, will be relegated to the status of complete 
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falsification. Further developments will rather be those where the field of validity is adjusted, 
but the changes made, conform to the basic axioms of the theory. 
Glancing at Newtonian physics and the successive developments of Relativity and Quantum 
Physics it can be argued that it is reasonable to maintain that revolutionary accounts are 
superfluous. The theories commit to results that do not conform to the Newtonian scheme and 
have proved outstandingly successful, yet, it remains that this has not resulted in the 
overthrowing of the grand structure of Newtonian physics. 
If granted, Weinberg’s assessment of Relativity and Quantum Physics establish a good case 
for a cumulative account of the major modern developments in physics. 
 
 
4. Anomalies 
4.1. Co-existence 
 
In my view Weinberg’s essay leaves out central issues when assessing contemporary physics. 
The first issue concerns the internal relationship between Relativity and Quantum physics
16
. 
The two theories are widely acknowledged and co-exist quite peacefully. Considering their 
applicability, initially it might seem that this is not a major concern.   
Firstly, the areas in which general relativity and quantum physics apply are limited; general 
relativity apply to phenomena of great velocities and gravitation, stars and the like while 
quantum physics applies to subatomic properties. Typically, phenomena of our everyday 
surroundings can be explained only by applying classical physics. Secondly, although they are 
both physical theories, they apply to opposite ends of the field. Relativity and Quantum 
physics deal with macroscopic- and microscopic phenomena, respectively.  
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 This point I owe largely to Audretsch (1993). 
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However, on a closer examination two aspects make this co-existence less plausible. Both 
theories must be regarded as general theories, in that they both suggest that all phenomena are 
subject to the dynamics they propose and, secondly, they are incompatible theories. 
(1) In Special Relativity space and time are integrated into a four-dimensional totality, while 
our perceptions of this totality are relative to our state of motion. General Relativity postulates 
that gravity is an aspect of space-time itself. Although Relativity dissolves the strict 
separability of the classical notions of space and time, relativistic systems can be reduced to 
the sum of its separate components and measurements can be performed without interfering 
with the system. Relativistic systems are subject to classical measurement and comply with 
the classical notions of locality and predictability. 
(2) Such observer-independency does not comply with quantum mechanical systems. 
Quantum physics demonstrates our ignorance of physical systems. In quantum systems, the 
precision with which physical properties, like position and momentum, can be measured 
simultaneously is limited. Generally, the more precisely the momentum is measured, the less 
precisely the position can be measured, and vice versa. This indicates that quantum systems  
do not determine their future state, but rather determine possible future states for that system, 
each possibility with its own probability. And hence, that causes only probabilistically 
determine their effects by determining all the possible states of the system. If it is granted that 
quantum mechanics is a complete description, it follows that the measurement displays 
properties of the system itself, and that between measurements the particle cannot be ascribed 
specific properties.   
On this reading, both theories display many characteristics that comply with those of 
paradigms in the Kuhnian sense. If granted, this analysis depicts a state of dual paradigms
17
 
and accordingly does not comply with Kuhn’s scheme. This is, I think, not a radical position. 
However, although this is in accordance with Weinberg’s claim that Kuhn’s scheme cannot 
properly describe modern physics, this is not an argument Weinberg can adopt. Weinberg’s 
premise for disallowing Kuhn’s scheme is that modern physics does not demonstrate 
anomalies to the extent that revolutionary change is plausible. Oppositely, my premise for the 
same conclusion is that the contemporary situation does demonstrate anomalies to the extent 
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 In Structure there are instances when paradigms co-exist, but these are in regards to pre-scientific periods. 
Modern physics does not comply with Kuhn’s notion of a pre-scientific state. 
 11 
that revolutionary changes are plausible, but that the nature of the anomalies oppose the 
morphology of Kuhn’s scheme. 
Similarly, in regards to the claim that there has been no scientific revolution in modern 
physics, the difference between mine and Weinberg’s positions is actualized further. 
 
 
4.2. A wider concept of paradigm 
 
In my opinion, a second issue that is not being properly accounted for in Weinberg’s essay is 
the different aspects of a paradigm. Consider again the shift from Aristotelian to Newtonian 
physics; Newton’s insight that motion could properly be explained mechanically established, 
initially, a change in the equations themselves, and subsequently stimulated a general 
examination of the concepts of motion. At the time, these concepts were still derived from 
Aristotelian notions of the inert qualities of physical bodies, but were reconstructed in 
accordance with the mechanical theory. Ultimately, the totality of Aristotle’s theory of motion 
and its metaphysical framework shifted. This revolutionary shift is admitted by Weinberg on 
the premise that Aristotle’s scheme was not a mature theory - dissimilar to Newton’s. 
Although there is a lot to be said for the superiority of the latter in regards to maturity, a more 
general view of Newton’s scheme makes this sharp divide less tenable.  
I agree with Weinberg that Newton’s scheme is most successful. For any general theory its 
status is closely connected to its ability to extend its domain of application. The Newtonian 
scheme had a remarkable ability to extend its range continuously, explaining an increasing 
number of areas and processes and providing increasingly precise predictions. But the success 
and uncontested status of Newtonian mechanics and classical physics at the end of the 19
th
 
century is integrally connected to a conceptual framework, and this makes it more vulnerable. 
Particularly, two notions, metaphysical and epistemological respectively, are indispensable: 
 
(1) Determinism. This is, simply stated, the view that every event is causally determined by 
prior events. Or in the infamous words of Laplace;  
 12 
“We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of 
its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature in 
motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were 
also vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the 
movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such 
an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present 
before its eyes.”
18
 
(2) Naïve or direct realism; the position that we perceive the world exactly as it exists. This 
notion enables the classical observer that perceives reality directly without interfering with it.  
Some degree of the interconnectedness of the Newtonian scheme with determinism and direct 
realism, I think, is easily admitted, regardless of ones commitment to any particular 
philosophy of science. Thus, if one commits to a cumulative position on modern physics, one 
must commit to one of two positions:  
(A) The metaphysical and epistemological aspects of the Newtonian scheme are not 
challenged (and, hence, there will be no revolutionary change), because the theories in 
modern physics are compatible. 
(B) The metaphysical and epistemological aspect may be substituted, but this will not 
constitute changes of a revolutionary nature. Possible incompatibilities in modern physics are 
mainly in regards to the conceptual framework, and, in itself, changes in the conceptual 
framework are of a lesser significance. In solidifying his assessment, Weinberg advocates the 
latter position
19
. 
“It is important to keep straight what does and what does not change in scientific 
revolutions, a distinction that is not made in Structure. There is a “hard” part of modern 
physical theories that usually consists of the equations themselves (…) then there is a 
“soft” part; it is the vision of reality that we use to explain to ourselves why the equations 
work. (…) The soft parts change (…) But after our theories reach their mature forms, 
their hard parts represent permanent accomplishments”
20
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 Above, Weinberg advocates position (A); “No aspect of modern physics is subject to revolutionary change, 
because its theories are compatible”. 
 
20
 Weinberg, pp. 50 
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Weinberg’s argument rests on the ability to make plausible the casual (loose) connection 
between the different aspects of a paradigm; if he can maintain this casuality the anomalies of 
modern physics are of lesser significance, and the theories sufficiently coherent to allow his 
reductive analysis. As denoted above a paradigm is a set of assumptions and a commitment to 
some special knowledge content. This definition fits well with Weinberg’s argument, as it 
designates the status of the equations themselves as the main issue to be resolved. In the 
passage above, this aspect of a paradigm is detached from the conceptual framework 
completely.  
In Kuhn’s scheme, conceptualization is the central notion in establishing a scientific 
community or in the case of a paradigm shift; reconceptualization. Contrastingly, Kuhn 
advocates a close connection between the aspects of a paradigm and demonstrates this by 
suggesting how the emergence of anomalies reveals this. Scientific theories rest on 
observation, and in periods of normal science the observations that are made conform to each 
other and constitute a coherent model. When normal science is disrupted by the emergence of 
anomalies two things occur; the latency of the underlying assumptions become evident, and 
exactly how interwoven the axioms themselves are to a conceptual framework is made 
evident.  
“(…) two men whose discourse had previously proceeded with apparently full 
understanding may suddenly find themselves responding to the same stimulus with 
incompatible descriptions and generalizations”
21
  
Scientific observations occur within a scientific community and are made by subjects that are 
familiar with a general scheme, and its relevance can under no circumstances be dismissed 
altogether. Assembling of data is to interrelate observations and ascribe them as coherent with 
a conceptual framework. 
 “The point I have been trying to make is a simple one, long familiar in philosophy of 
science. Debates over the theory-choice cannot be cast in a form that fully resembles 
logical or mathematical proof. In the latter, premises and rules of inference are stipulated 
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 Kuhn pp. 201 
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from the start. If there is disagreement about conclusions, the parties to the ensuing 
debate can retrace their steps one by one, checking against prior stipulation.”
22
  
In my opinion this is indeed a simple point, and I do not consider it to be a radical one. In fact, 
considered isolated, I think that Weinberg does not object to it. However, this is his premise; a 
mature science can be excluded from revolutionary changes, precisely and solely, because it is 
capable of providing observations that are not theory-laden.  
"these changes have been evolutionary, not revolutionary. Nature seems to act on us as a 
teaching machine. When a scientist reaches a new understanding of nature, he or she 
experiences an intense pleasure. These experiences over long periods have taught us how 
to judge what sort of scientific theory will provide the pleasure of understanding 
nature."
23
 
In this respect, Weinberg’s mature/pre-mature-scheme is equivalent to a positivist view as he 
adopts the classical observer and direct realism exhaustively. Consequently, Weinberg 
extends his position by advocating that Kuhn overemphasizes the extent that the soft parts 
change.  
“ Some of what Kuhn said about paradigm shifts does apply to the soft parts of our 
theories, but even here I think that Kuhn overestimated the degree to which scientists 
during a period of normal science are captives of their paradigms.”
24
 
This is at the very least consistent. It would seem arbitrary to argue that the metaphysical 
framework or “the vision of reality that we use to explain ourselves why the equations work” 
is subject to unlimited change and can be completely transformed while “the equations 
themselves” remain valid. This is true of mathematical equations, as laid out by Kuhn above 
(because they do not rely upon a metaphysical framework); all the premises are articulated 
and agreed upon, and confirming them is a matter of examining the procedure. I assume that 
Weinberg means something more than this with “the equations themselves”. On such a 
perspective, the shift from Aristotle’s to Newton’s paradigm can be construed as evolutionary 
to the extent that the predictions of Aristotle’s theory are correct. To strictly separate hard and 
                                                 
22 Kuhn, Pp. 199. This passage is in the context of commenting on his notion of incommensurability, but 
pertains to the debate on theory-laden observations and interaction of “soft” and “hard” parts 
23
 Weinberg, pp. 50 
24
 Weinberg, pp. 50 
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soft parts of a mature science, is a case of reducing “the vision of reality that we use to explain 
ourselves why the equations work”, to this purpose alone.  
My objections to Weinberg’s position are all connected to his downplay of the significance of 
conceptualization. By considering a physical theory within the full extent of its metaphysical 
framework, it is hard to conduct a positivist model. As a general approach to an assessment of 
modern physics I would like to go in the other direction and employ a broader perspective of a 
paradigm; not only the equations themselves but their metaphysical and epistemological 
framework. It is in my opinion in regard to this further aspect
25
 that the extent of emerging 
anomalies can be properly recognized and evaluated.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Conceptualization pertains to the general debate of observation, but ironically, the issue is 
specifically actualized by modern physics, in particular by quantum mechanics.  
Considering the notions of “wave-particle duality” and “non-locality” the direct opposition to 
the metaphysics of the Newtonian-scheme is accentuated.  
 
The conventional approach in providing a physical model to quantum mechanics is the 
“Copenhagen interpretation”. A quantum system is described by a wave function representing 
a mixed state of possible values. When a measurement is performed the system is ascribed 
one of the values of the wave function. This is the “collapse of the wave function”. In 
classical systems, it is assumed that whenever a measurement is conducted it reveals the 
properties of the object, and does in no way constitute the phenomena, such that the state of 
systems when they are measured reflect the state of those systems also when they are not 
                                                 
25
 there is often mention of a third aspect of a paradigm in Structure; the experiments and instruments 
themselves. This is a significant aspect that underlines if anomalies detect a flaw in a central instrument, this can 
expose inadequacies in the fundamental theory. However, I leave out further remarks on this matter. 
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measured. This is the view that under ideal conditions we see objects exactly as they are. In 
quantum systems the location of the particle is registered when the wavefunction collapses, 
but given that the wavefunction represents a complete description of the state of the system 
the particle is in a “superposition” of the possible states of the wave function in between 
measurements. Subatomic particles display both wave-like properties and particle-like 
properties, and the definite values that we ascribe to particles can not be maintained as a 
general description. It seems that the definite properties are as constitutive of the experimental 
set-up as of the particle itself. 
Einstein’s was convinced that particles must have well-defined properties with exact values 
between measurements, and regarded that quantum mechanics must be an incomplete 
description. Along with Podolsky and Rosen, Einstein
26
 demonstrated how it can be deduced 
from quantum mechanics that certain particles retain interconnectedness even at a distance, 
and construed a thought experiment, that revealed absurd implications. It describes an 
experimental set-up with two particles that are emitted simultaneously in opposite directions 
that subsequently register in linear polarisers. The polarisers can register one of two 
outcomes, + or -. The particles are “entangled” in such a way that they have opposite values 
of the same property. Hence, if a measurement of the first particle yields +, the measurement 
on the other yields - . This should happen simultaneously and regardless of the distance 
between them. 
Alain Aspect and his colleagues carried out this experiment in 1982, and the results 
conformed to the predictions of quantum physics. The Aspect-experiment was conducted 
using a device ensuring that the value being measured was selected randomly, and a distance 
between the measurements that any causal connections between the particles would have to 
travel at a speed greater than the speed of light. The experimental results retained the 
interconnectedness between the two particles, such that the measurement on the first particle 
decided the measurement of the other. If this is regarded as complete, it violates locality as the 
range of properties cannot be ascribed to the particles individually.  
The Copenhagen interpretation separates between a deterministic measuring apparatus and a 
probabilistic quantum system, and thus applies a hybrid-scheme. Generally, a proper physical 
model ought to account for all of its systems as subject to the same physical laws. Further, it 
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provides no analysis of the collapse of the wave function besides ascribing it to observation 
itself, and restricts the purpose of physics to deliver consistent experimental results. 
Schrödinger’s infamous thought experiment was construed to demonstrate the absurdity that 
follows from ascribing the particle acquiring definite properties to observation itself; the cat 
would remain in a state of probability of dead or alive until an observation is made. However, 
it remains that exact properties of the mixed state of probabilities is determined exactly when 
a measurement is performed, and that the hybrid-model of the Copenhagen interpretation is 
regarded as the closest thing we have to a general conceptualization of quantum mechanics. 
Ever since its conception quantum physics has contended most common-sense notions about 
natural laws. Throughout this period there have been continuous attempts to comprehend 
these challenges, yet there remains somewhat of a void where the metaphysics should be 
established. The underdevelopment of the metaphysical and epistemological challenges of 
Relativity and Quantum Physics is in my opinion what enables Weinberg to make it plausible 
that evolutionary changes can be retained as a sufficient account of modern physics.  
Strategically, there is, however, a consensus: The ongoing search for unification between 
Relativity and Quantum physics is a joint effort - rejection of is a non-issue. Hence, the test 
for a proper paradigmatic assessment of modern physics should address the nature of a unified 
theory. Weinberg does not acknowledge the radical nature of this project: 
"We hope that in the next great step forward in physics we shall see the theory of 
gravitation and all of the different branches of elementary particle physics flow together 
into a single unified theory. This is what we are working for and what we spend the 
taxpayers' money for. And when we have discovered this theory, it will be part of a true 
description of reality."
27
  
 
To achieve this without revolutionary change requires that an epistemological and 
metaphysical framework that properly accounts for Relativity and Quantum physics, can 
integrate naïve realism and determinism in an evolutionary manner. I object to this, and the 
position that an abandonment of the classical concepts of observer-independence and locality, 
or in Weinberg’s words that “the soft parts change”, does not constitute revolutionary change. 
Generally, I argue that modern scientific theories can not provide a foundation that is not 
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theory-laden. Specifically, I argue that the developments in physics in the 20
th
 century 
underline this position and, themselves, make an argument that scientific development 
remains revolutionary. The shift from Aristotelian to Newtonian physics is upheld as an 
exemplary case of revolutionary change in the history of science, yet, ironically, Aristotles 
notion of potentia
28
 or potentiality (“essences of natural bodies”) seems in some respects, 
closer to the metaphysical direction of a unified theory than to that of the self-sufficiency and 
singularity of classical physics.I think it bold to state that a successful physical theory that 
unifies Relativity and Quantum physics will not conceptualize its axioms applying 
metaphysical notions that are revolutionary different from the strict separability of observer 
and phenomena of the Newtonian scheme.  
 
Hence, the success of modern physics pose a direct threat to the Newtonian scheme, but, in 
accounting for modern physics it is the shortcomings of a new conceptual framework, rather 
than the success of the Newtonian scheme that is the reason the latter is still maintained. The 
recognition of our failure to comprehend the philosophical implications of modern physics, 
whether this should be ascribed to our mental conditioning or is simply a matter of 
impatience, solidifies that a cumulative account is insufficient. 
At the very least I think there is no reason to declare the end-of-science. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28
 ”Potentia” or ”actus”. The abililty to change or to act. Aristotle. (1984). 
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